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“It is, indeed regrettable that the empirical data on a subject such as 
this are sparse, but we need not ignore the data which do exist 
simply because further refinement would be even more helpful.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article studies the felonious killings of police officers while 
serving arrest warrants and other legal process.2  The study seeks to test 
 * The author is currently an associate professor at Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry, NY.  
 1. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 n.2 (1997) (commenting on the need for 
more data on police victimization). 
 2. The situations included and excluded from the research are discussed in the 
methodology section.  See infra Part II. 
623 
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the underlying assumptions of the rationale of Maryland v. Buie,3 
concerning the dangers of warrant execution.4  Although the Buie 
decision relied on numerous empirically testable assumptions, the crux 
of the decision focused on third party attacks against the police after 
the principle suspect was securely in custody.5  Another question is 
also examined in the research: Did Buie cause a measurable change on 
the rates of felonious police fatalities during the service of arrest 
warrants or other legal process that is attributable to the expanded 
search ability extended to police?6 
In Buie, the United States Supreme Court extended the search 
powers of police when executing a lawful arrest warrant.7  Specifically, 
Buie extended the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion of danger to 
the officer to the execution of arrest warrants in private homes.8  The 
Buie Court’s underlying rationale was the execution of an arrest 
warrant in a suspect’s home is inherently dangerous9 and the dangers 
are not dispelled when the suspect is in police custody and control.10  
The potential danger extends to hypothetical and unknown third parties 
that may potentially ambush the police.11 
Part I addresses the Fourth Amendment issues surrounding 
dangers to the police.12  Part II is an overview of the literature on 
dangers confronting the police and the little that is known about 
warrant execution.13  Part III discusses the data sources and methods 
used in the analysis.14  Part IV undertakes an analysis of the data to test 
the assumptions identified in Part I.15  Lastly, Part V discusses the 
findings and the conclusions of the data analysis.16 
 3. 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
 4. See infra Part VI. 
 5. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 328 (1990). 
 6. See infra Part VI. 
 7. Buie, 494 U.S. at 325 (1990). 
 8. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
 9. Id. at 333 (“Moreover, unlike the encounter on the street or along a highway, an in-
home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary’s ‘turf.’  An 
ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in 
open, more familiar surroundings.”).  
 10. Id. (“In the instant case, there is an analogous interest of the officers in taking steps 
to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is 
not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an 
attack.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part V. 
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND DANGEROUS SITUATIONS 
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unlawful searches 
and seizures by government agents.17  It requires that all searches and 
seizures be reasonable18 and that all searches and seizures justified by a 
warrant be supported by probable cause and numerous other 
requirements expressly stated in the Amendment.19  Until 1968, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require that all 
searches and seizures, whether conducted with or without a warrant, be 
supported by probable cause.20  Terry v. Ohio21 permitted the police to 
conduct a limited frisk of suspects for officer safety on a lesser 
standard than probable cause.22  This came to be known as “stop and 
frisk” or a “Terry stop.”23  Although probable cause did not exist, the 
police were permitted to undertake searches and seizures on a restricted 
basis to protect the officer from potentially violent suspects.24 
In 1983, the Supreme Court extended the Terry standard to motor 
vehicle stops.25  In Michigan v. Long, the police were permitted to 
undertake a search of a motor vehicle and its contents for the purpose 
of locating weapons that might be used against the officer, despite the 
fact that the sole occupant of the vehicle was already under the control 
of the police.26  The general theme of Terry, that policing is an 
inherently dangerous occupation, was extended in Long to include 
specific situations that are dangerous,27 namely motor vehicle stops.28  
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath and 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”); see John Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the 
Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105 (1989). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2. 
 20. Id. Certain administrative searches for public health purposes were permitted on 
less than probable cause in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967).  Despite the fact that Terry created a new lesser standard justifying police intrusions 
on citizens Fourth Amendment rights, legal scholars have noted skepticism as to whether 
this actually resulted in any change in police practices for on street encounters.  See Wayne 
R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 39, 40–46 (1968). 
 21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 22. Id. at 30. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 26. Id. 
 27. The Terry Court, although primarily addressing the general dangerousness of 
policing, did acknowledge particular aspects of “on-the-street encounters” that are 
dangerous; Terry, 329 U.S. at 18 n.15. 
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Maryland v. Buie followed the same general principle, that policing is 
dangerous, to the specific situation of executing arrest warrants in the 
suspect’s home.29 
A. Buie and the Protective Sweep Doctrine 
Jerome Edward Buie was suspected of being involved in an armed 
robbery; subsequently, the police secured an arrest warrant for him.30  
The police placed Buie’s home under surveillance and later executed 
Buie’s arrest warrant.31  While the police were executing an arrest 
warrant at the house, Buie emerged from the basement and surrendered 
without incident.32  Buie was removed from his home while a detective 
continued to sweep Buie’s house for other individuals.33  During the 
protective sweep of the basement, the detective found a red running 
suit which was later used as evidence at Buie’s trial.34 
The Supreme Court analyzed the Buie case to determine if the 
police were justified in conducting the search of the basement and 
seizure of the running suit without probable cause.35  The Buie Court 
held that the search of the basement after Buie’s arrest was unlawful as 
a search incident to a lawful arrest.36  Since Buie had already been 
arrested and the basement was not within his wing span,37 the search 
could not be lawful under Chimel v. California.38  Absent some other 
justification, the police were required to possess probable cause to 
justify the search39 and there was no probable cause to search the 
 28. Long, 463 U.S. at 1047. 
 29. Buie, 494 U.S. at 332–33. 
 30. Id. at 328. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. See id. at 330 (“The issue in this case is what level of justification the Fourth 
Amendment required before Detective Frolich could legally enter the basement to see if 
someone else was there.”). 
 36. Id. at 336 (citing Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (“Affirmance is not required by Chimel v. California, where . . . the justifiable 
search incident to an in-house arrest could not extend beyond the arrestee’s person and the 
area from within which the arrestee might have obtained a weapon.  First, Chimel was 
concerned with a full-blown search of the entire house for evidence of the crime for which 
the arrest was made, not the more limited intrusion contemplated by a protective sweep.  
Second, the justification for the search incident to arrest considered in Chimel was the threat 
posed by the arrestee, not the safety threat posed by the house, or more properly by unseen 
third parties in the house.” (citations omitted)). 
 39. Id. at 332–33 (“Possessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe Buie 
was in his home, the officers were entitled to enter and to search anywhere in the house in 
which Buie might be found, however, the search for him was over, and there was no longer 
 
LICHTENBERG FINAL 8/21/2014  4:05 PM 
2014] THE PROTECTIVE SWEEP DOCTRINE 627 
basement once the arrest was executed fully.40 
The Court entertained the question of what level of justification is 
required before the police could lawfully enter the basement to 
discover if anyone else was present.41  The Court analyzed the situation 
under the reasonableness test42 where the interests of the state are 
balanced against the suspect’s privacy interests.43  In arriving at its 
conclusion, the Court reviewed two prior cases, Terry v. Ohio and 
Michigan v. Long.44  The Court’s concern in Terry and Long for officer 
safety involved dispelling the officer’s concern that the person with 
whom they were dealing was not armed or otherwise dangerous.45  The 
Court approached the search of the home in the same context.46  The 
concern in Buie was not an immediate known suspect, as in Terry, but 
unknown third parties whose presence, or lack thereof, was unknown to 
the police.47 
The Court also concluded that the in-house arrest was more 
dangerous than the situations in Terry and Long.48  The basis of this 
rationale was an issue of turf—the suspect’s home was his environment 
and the officer was at a greater disadvantage than on-the- street where 
circumstances are more equal.49  The Court concluded that the facts of 
Buie, the existence of a possibly dangerous third party, were a 
sufficient justification to outweigh the intrusion upon Buie’s privacy 
interests.50  The Court thus created a standard that differed from 
that particular justification for entering any rooms that had not yet been searched.”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 331–32. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 333 (“In Terry and Long we were concerned with the immediate interests 
of the police officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the persons with whom they 
were dealing were not armed, or able to gain immediate control of, a weapon that could 
unexpectedly and fatally be used against them.”). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. (“[T]he officers [had an interest] in taking steps to assure themselves that 
the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other 
persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack.  The risk of 
danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great as, if not greater than, it is on-the-
street or roadside investigatory encounter.”). 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. (“Moreover, unlike an encounter on the street or along a highway, an in-home 
arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary’s ‘turf.’  An ambush in a 
confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more 
familiar surroundings.”). 
 50. See id. at 334 (“We are quite sure, however, that the arresting officers are permitted 
in such circumstances to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, 
the arrest.  That interest is sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may entail.”). 
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Chimel because it did not involve the dangerousness of the suspect;51 it 
involved unknown third parties.52  It differed from Terry because it did 
not require individualized suspicion,53 as the existence of a third party 
is not known until the search has been conducted.54  But the 
dangerousness theme underlies the entire rationale behind the Buie 
holding:55 the execution of arrest warrants is a dangerous business, the 
danger is not dispelled upon the successful arrest and incapacitation of 
the suspect, and third parties continue to pose a serious risk.56 
The Court relied upon the same basic assumption in Terry, Long, 
and Buie: policing is a dangerous occupation and there is a great risk of 
intentional harm being inflicted on the police in the course of their 
duties.57  Terry created this rationale and Long and Buie relied on it 
almost exclusively.58  In Long and Buie, the Court created situation-
specific assumptions concerning specific police activities.59  These 
decisions identify specific activities that are uniquely dangerous to the 
police and permit the expansion of police discretion and authority to 
reduce the likelihood of danger without threatening the integrity of 
evidence incidentally obtained in the due course of exercising this 
discretion.60  Buie extended the policing-as-a-dangerous-occupation 
rationale further than Terry and Long, as it applied only to potential or 
hypothetical dangers that might or could exist rather than potential 
threats from existing parties in the flesh.61  In addition, Buie justified 
intrusions into a suspect’s dwelling—a place where the Fourth 
Amendment has long been held to provide its greatest protections.62 
II. RESEARCH ON POLICE DANGEROUSNESS 
Violence directed towards the police has been the topic of 
 51. See id. at 336. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. at 334 (“Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts 
which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a 
reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing 
a danger to those at the arrest scene.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 331 (“The Terry case is most instructive for present purposes.”).  
 56. Id. at 333. 
 57. See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 
(1983). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. “A man’s home is his castle” is a long quoted legal axiom.  See Wilson v. Lane, 
526 U.S. 603, 609–10 (1999). 
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numerous studies over the past several decades.63  However, the 
application of research toward the violent victimization of the police in 
a context specific to the Fourth Amendment has only recently been 
examined.64  One finding contradicted Terry’s expressly and implicitly 
stated assumptions that policing was a dangerous occupation.65  This 
 63. See generally Sean A. Grennan, Findings on the Role of Officer Gender in Violent 
Encounters with Citizens, 15 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 78 (1987); Rebecca Reviere & 
Vernetta D. Young, Mortality of Police Officers: Comparisons by Length of Time on the 
Force, 13 AM. J. POLICE 51 (1994); David Konstantin, Homicides of American Law 
Enforcement Officers 1978–1980, 1 JUST. Q. 29 (1984); Terry D. Edwards, Felonious 
Killings of State Police and Highway Patrol Officers: A Descriptive and Comparative 
Evaluation, 14 AM. J. POLICE 89 (1994); Joel Garner & Elizabeth Clemmer, Danger to 
Police in Domestic Disturbances—A New Look, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., Nov. 1986; Albert P. 
Cardarelli, An Analysis of Police Killed by Criminal Action: 1961–1963, 59 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 447 (1968); Robert E. Little, Cop Killing: A Descriptive 
Analysis of the Problem, 7 POLICE STUD. 68 (1984); Charles Moorman, Police Officers 
Murdered in California with One Shot: The 1980’s, 24 J. CAL. L. ENFORCEMENT 1 (1990); 
Larry Roberts, An Analysis of Fatal Assaults Upon Law Enforcement Officers Which 
Occurred in the United States From 1972 Through 1978 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi) (on file with author); John G. Stratton et 
al., Police in a Violent Society, 54 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1 (1985); Lawrence W. 
Sherman et al., Police Murder in Drug-Related Situations, 1972–1988, in CRIME CONTROL 
REP. No. 7 (1989); Max Boylen & Robert Little, Fatal Assaults on United States Law 
Enforcement Officers, 63 POLICE J. 61 (1990); David Lester, Predicting Murder Rates of 
Police Officers in Urban Areas, 7 POLICE L.Q. 20 (1978); Mitchell B. Chamlin, Conflict 
Theory and Police Killings, 10 DEVIANT BEHAV. 353 (1989); Laura A. Wilson & C. 
Kenneth Meyer, Violence at the Street Level: Police Casualties and Fatalities, 64 POLICE J. 
28 (1990); Freidrich Wenz, Death Anxiety Among Law Enforcement Officers, 7 J. POLICE 
SCI. & ADMIN. 230 (1979); Francis Cullen et al., Paradox in Policing: A Note on 
Perceptions of Danger, 11 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 457 (1983); James C. Hackler & 
Christian T. L. Janssen, Police Killings in Perspective, 27 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 227 
(1985); SAMUEL G. CHAPMAN, COPS, KILLERS, AND STAYING ALIVE: THE MURDER OF 
POLICE OFFICERS IN AMERICA (1986); William Wilbanks, Cops Killed and Cop-Killers: An 
Historical Perspective, 13 AM. J. POLICE 31 (1994); L. DYKSTRA, ILLINOIS LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSAULTED OR KILLED: 1972–1982 (1984); FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, KILLED IN THE LINE OF DUTY: A STUDY OF SELECTED FELONIOUS 
KILLINGS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (1992); David Lester, A Study of Civilian-
caused Murders of Police Officers, 6 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 373 (1978); 
MONA MARGARITA, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE AGAINST POLICE (1980); Ruth D. Peterson & 
William C. Bailey, Structural Influences on the Killing of Police: A Comparison with 
General Homicides, 5 JUST. Q. 207 (1988); Edward F. Davis & Anthony J. Pinizzotto, 
Above and Beyond the Call of Duty: Preventing Off-Duty Officer Deaths, 65 FBI L. 
ENFORCEMENT BULL. No. 4, 1996, at 1; Cindy Clarke & Mark J. Zak, Fatalities to Law 
Enforcement Officers and Firefighters, 1992–1997, COMPENSATION & WORKING 
CONDITIONS, Summer 1999, at 3–7; JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEPT OF 
JUST., POLICING AND HOMICIDE, 1976–1998: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY POLICE, POLICE 
OFFICERS MURDERED BY FELONS (2001); Candice Batton, Police Murders: An Examination 
of Historical Trends in the Killing of Law Enforcement Officers in the United States, 1947 to 
1998, 10 HOMICIDE STUD. 79 (2006). 
 64. See infra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
 65. Illya Lichtenberg, Alisa Smith & Michael Copeland, Terry and Beyond: Testing the 
Underlying Assumption of Reasonable Suspicion, 17 TOURO L. REV. 439, 458–59 (2001). 
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study, examining the underlying rationale of Terry, compared police 
homicide victimization rates to the victimization rates of the general 
population, while controlling for the demographic characteristics of age 
and sex.66  The study found that the victimization rates for police were 
considerably lower than the demographically controlled population.67 
Another study examined the dangerousness of motor vehicles 
stops to the police.68  Rather than comparing the rates of victimization, 
the study utilized a “danger ratio.”69  The danger ratio controlled for 
the frequency of the police activity rather than merely making 
comparisons between aggregate numbers.70  The study found that 
roughly ten police officers were victims of felonious killing per year 
during motor vehicle stops.71  Because motor vehicle stop are so 
common in general police activities, the likelihood of such 
victimization was extremely unlikely.72  This study examined an 
assumption underlying motor vehicle stops in Michigan v. Long and 
uncovered evidence in part contradicting the assumption of the inherent 
dangers of motor vehicle stops in cases such as Long.73 
Unfortunately, the two studies aimed at examining dangers 
inherent to the police in the Fourth Amendment context failed to be 
situation specific.  The studies examined broadly defined assumptions 
of the Terry and Long Courts, but failed to provide more specific 
circumstances where a particular police activity is dangerous, as the 
reasonableness test requires.74  The reasonableness test is assessed on a 
case specific basis and does not rely on broad-based assumptions only 
partially related to the immediate situation in controversy.75 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (“Based on this analysis, male police officers are not placed at risk of homicide 
victimization, either on or off duty, beyond that which male citizens in a similar age group 
face daily.  The victimization rates between the two groups are very similar, and in fact it 
appears reasonable to conclude that police officers have a lower risk of homicide 
victimization than do the aggregate of males in a similar age group.  This finding contradicts 
the assumption in Terry and its progeny that police face greater risk than the general 
population.”). 
 68. Illya Lichtenberg & Alisa Smith, How Dangerous are Routine Police-Citizen 
Traffic Stops?: A Research Note, 29 J. OF CRIM. JUST.419, 419 (2001). 
 69. Id. at 420–21.  The danger ratio was adapted from the research of Joel Garner and 
Elizabeth Clemmer.  Garner & Clemmer, supra note 63, at 1 (examining the rate of police 
victimization while controlling for the frequency of the police activity). 
 70. Lichtenberg & Smith, supra note 68, at 419. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 425–26. 
 73. Id. 419–20; (specifically referring to Maryland v. Wilson, 591 U.S. 408 (1997) and 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and referring to Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 
113 (1999)). 
 74. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331–32 (1990). 
 75. Id. 
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Research relating specifically to the dangers of warrant service is 
unavailable.  Little research exists on warrants in general, and the little 
research that does exist focuses primarily on search warrants.76  These 
studies make no attempt to gauge the inherent dangers of warrant 
execution.  Their focus is primarily on search warrant applications, 
processes, and results, not execution.77  Although search and arrest 
warrant execution may be similar in many regards, they also differ in 
material respects.  Buie applies to arrest warrants, but it is unclear how 
Buie applies to the execution of search warrant.78  A search warrant 
seeks an object while an arrest warrant seeks a person.79  Thus, it is 
unlikely the limited data available on search warrants is of material use 
for empirically analyzing the execution of arrest warrants or legal 
process generally in a suspect’s home.  The absence of any references 
to the dangers of search warrant execution in the two studies is telling.  
Researchers conducted interviews and observations that could have 
uncovered whether serious safety concerns exist; however, the 
inference that the interviews did not uncover safety concerns is not 
dispositive.80 
Although the empirical research on violence against the police 
casts doubts upon parts of the underlying rationale of Terry and 
progeny, legal commentators have attempted to draw inferences from 
other research, which at least in part lends support to the Court’s 
conclusion in Buie.81  For example, research concludes that suburban 
police departments have measurably increased their use of bullet proof 
vests;82 between 1980 and 1990 there has been a seventy-nine percent 
increase in juveniles who murder with a gun;83 and juvenile boys and 
girls reported forty-one and twenty-one percent respectively could 
obtain a hand gun anytime they wanted.84  It is unclear how these 
assertions have direct application to the service of warrants or legal 
 76. Richard Van Duizend, L. Paul Sutton & Charlotte A. Carter, The Search Warrant 
Process: Preconceptions, Perceptions, and Practices, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
1968, at 3.171, 3.171–3.172; Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, 
Motions to Suppress, and “Lost Cases”: The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven 
Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1034 (1990). 
 77. Duizend et al., supra note 76, at 3.173–3.178; Uchida & Bynum, supra note 76, at 
1058. 
 78. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 327. 
 79. Uchida & Bynum, supra note 76, at 1058 (finding that search warrant execution 
lead to an arrest in fifty-four percent of the primary warrants executed). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Daniel L. Rotenberg, Essay: An Essay on the Unexpected Person Factor 
in Searches and Seizures, 39 ST. LOUIS L.J. 505 (1995). 
 82. Id. at 517 n.107. 
 83. Id. at 517 n.108. 
 84. Id. at 518 n.109. 
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process in the suspect’s home, but legal scholars have advanced 
arguments, at least in part based on empirical evidence, as support for 
the protective sweep doctrine.85 
Overall, empirical evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s 
assumptions concerning the dangers of policing may be misguided.  
Concerning the service of legal process and arrest warrants specifically 
at a suspect’s home, there is little evidence to support or refute the Buie 
Court’s assumptions concerning the inherent dangers posed by warrant 
execution and the unknown third parties who may launch an attack on 
the police. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The study presented in this article seeks to examine the situation-
specific assumptions of the Buie Court’s rationale.86  As noted earlier, 
the Buie decision is based upon the potential dangers presented by 
unknown third parties.87  The data collected for this study provide 
sufficient detail to draw conclusions concerning this assumption.  
Unlike previous studies testing assumptions of Terry and progeny, 
which focused on broad-based assumptions of dangerousness, this 
study seeks to examine the five principle assumptions of the Buie 
Court.88  First, the service of process, particularly arrest warrants is 
dangerous.89  Second, the home is more dangerous than the street.90  
Third, ambushes may occur.91  Fourth, the threat of lethal violence 
remains after the primary suspect has been securely placed in 
custody.92  Fifth, this threat of lethal violence arises from unknown 
third parties in the home.93 
This Part is split into two subsections.94  The first addresses the 
sources of data utilized in the study noting the strengths and limitations 
 85. See id. at 518. 
 86. The use of the word “examine” as opposed to “test” was intentional.  The data 
provide many insights into the variables, but additional data, currently unavailable, is 
necessary to test all of the assumptions fully.  The missing data is that of the “base rate” data 
not available discussed earlier. 
 87. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336 (1990). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See infra Part IV.A.  The term legal process is defined broadly to include the 
service of any process authorized by a judicial officer or being authorized by law.  This 
includes: arrest and search warrants; temporary restraining orders; civil commitment orders; 
a capias; bench warrant; civil judgment execution, or any other similar police activity with 
an eye towards inclusion. 
 90. See infra Part IV.B. 
 91. See infra Part IV.C. 
 92. See infra Part IV.D. 
 93. See infra Part IV.E. 
 94. See infra Part III. 
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of the data sources.95  The second subsection discusses how the 
variables in the study were created from the data.96 
A. Data Source 
The data sources used for the study were derived from Law 
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (“LEOKA”),97 an annual 
publication of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.98  The data provided 
by LEOKA includes all line of duty deaths of police officers on or off 
duty.99  The data on deaths is separated into two primary categories:100 
accidental killings and felonious killings.101  In addition to providing 
aggregate statistics for the United States and its territories102 on the 
felonious killings of police, the LEOKA provides a narrative summary 
description of each felonious killing.103  LEOKA does not provide any 
aggregate statistics on the felonious killings of police officers during 
the service of legal process or for warrant service, nor any comparable 
situational data.104  The felonious killings occurring during warrant 
execution and other legal process service were derived from the 
narrative summaries of felonious killings in LEOKA.105  The 
summaries selected for inclusion in the study were the execution or 
service of any legal process.  The study construes legal process 
liberally to promote inclusion of felonious killings unless the 
descriptions clearly fell outside the possible scope of the Buie decision. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting 
Section (“UCR”) collects the LEOKA data.106  The UCR uses three 
methods for collecting information on police officers feloniously killed 
 95. See infra Part III.A. 
 96. See infra Part III.B. 
 97. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED (1996) [hereinafter LEOKA]. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 3. 
 100. Id. at 3–5. 
 101. Id.  It should be noted that felonious killings include a definition that is 
considerably broader than the traditional measures of murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter measured in the Uniform Crime Reports. 
 102. The geographic scope of LEOKA is broader than the traditional Uniform Crime 
Reporting as it includes United States territories such as the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and 
Puerto Rico.  LEOKA also includes United States law enforcement officers killed in other 
countries.  See id. at 62 tbl.22. 
 103. Id. at 41–57. 
 104. The closest classification provided by LEOKA is “arrest situations,” which is very 
broad and includes by majority non-warrant initiated arrests. 
 105. LEOKA compiles a “summary of incidents” resulting in the felonious killing of a 
police officer for each year it is published. 
 106. LEOKA, supra note 97, at 1. 
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in the line of duty.107  First, police agencies participating in the 
Uniform Crime Reporting Program notify the UCR of the duty-related 
death and provide preliminary data.108  The respective FBI field 
division also reports these incidents in the geographic area where the 
police officer was killed.109  Once reported to the UCR, the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, through the Public Safety Officers Benefits 
Program administrator, does a follow up throughout the year.110  The 
UCR considers this threefold reporting mechanism as providing valid 
and complete data.111  Because of these three data collection 
procedures, the infrequency in which police are killed feloniously,112 
and the fact that the data provided are from the police on their own 
members,113 suggests the quality of this secondary data source is quite 
high in comparison to other measures of criminal victimization.114  The 
single greatest validity threat to the quality of the data is that because 
police provide the data on their own membership, there is the real 
possibility that the data omits misconduct, violence, or other 
questionable behavior by the victim-officer or that an officer 
strategically writes the report to mask police deviance.115 
B. Variables and Definitions 
Several variables were created from the summary descriptions 
provided in LEOKA of police officers feloniously killed during the 
execution or service of process.  The first variable is the form of 
process being served.  The second variable identifies the location of 
where the fatal incident between the police and the suspect occurred.  
The third variable specifies whether the suspect was secured or not 
when the felonious killing occurred.  The fourth variable identifies 
 107. Id.. 
 108. Id. (explaining that virtually all police agencies participate in the UCR program). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Lichtenberg et al., supra note 65. 
 113. LEOKA, supra note 97, at 1. 
 114. Walter R. Gove et al., Are Uniform Crime Reports a Valid Indicator of Index 
Crimes?  An Affirmative Answer with Minor Qualifications, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 451 (1985); 
Philip J. Cook, The Case of the Missing Victims: Gunshot Woundings in the National Crime 
Survey, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 91 (1987); Scott Menard, Short Term Trends in 
Crime and Delinquency: A comparison of UCR, NCS, and Self-Report Data, 4 JUSTICE Q. 
455 (1982); Richard McCleary et al., Uniform Crime Reports as Organizational Outcomes: 
Three Times Series Experiments, 29 SOC. PROBS. 361 (1982). 
 115. Two highly publicized incidents, Waco and Ruby Ridge, are included in the 
analysis, which raise suspicions concerning the data’s integrity.  For example, in the Ruby 
Ridge incident, the man who killed the officer was acquitted.  See Harris v. Roderick, 933 F. 
Supp. 977 (D. Idaho 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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whether the felonious killings were the product of an ambush.  The 
fifth variable indicates whether a third party caused the felonious 
killing. 
Process: Process describes the intended activity being undertaken 
by the police when the felonious killing occurred.  These are 
categorized into the following classifications:116 
Arrest Warrant: This includes arrest warrants and bench 
warrants.117  The definition also includes felonious killings where the 
initial contact between the police and the suspect was based on other 
grounds but an active warrant was discovered during the contact or 
known to the officer prior to the officer’s death.  The police officer was 
not required to possess the warrant at the time of the felonious killing; 
but only required to have knowledge of its existence.  Instances where 
the existence of a warrant was unclear, VOPs (Violation of Probations) 
and PVs (Parole Violations), were also coded as arrest warrant.  
Because Buie applied to arrest warrants, in some analyses a separate 
analysis of arrest warrants is conducted in that section. 
Search Warrant: This includes all felonious killings where the 
police officer was in possession of a search warrant and had the intent 
to or was present for the purpose of executing the warrant.  In addition, 
retaliatory killings after execution of the search warrant were included. 
Search and Arrest Warrant: This includes all circumstances where 
both an arrest warrant and a search warrant were in the possession of 
the police. 
Temporary Restraining Order: This includes all cases where the 
police went to a residence or other location for the purpose of serving a 
temporary or permanent restraining order or similar process. 
Involuntary Commitment: This includes all cases where the police 
possessed a court order for involuntary commitment or court order for 
psychiatric testing to be served on the subject and/or for ordering the 
suspect be taken into custody. 
Civil Process: This includes all service of a civil nature other than 
mental health.  This variable could also be defined as any process that 
is not criminal or psychiatric in origin. 
Third Party: Third party is defined as any person directly 
connected to the killing of the police officer who is not the target of the 
process.  Because search warrants are directed at property and not at 
individual people, it was impossible to determine if third parties 
 116. Abbreviated terms used in the tables follow the form of process in parenthesis. 
 117. Bench warrants differ from arrest warrants in that bench warrants are for a failure 
to appear in court as where arrest warrants are for an actual offense. 
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existed, thus this variable was not applied to search warrant killings.118 
Location: The location of the killing was coded as one of five 
categories: one indoor and four outdoor.  Room refers to any killing 
occurring inside a primary residential dwelling.  Entrance, indicates 
that the killing occurred at any entrance into a structure, including 
porches, front doors, and apartment building hallways and staircases.  
Forced entry refers to the officer being killed immediately upon forced 
entry, generally limited to knock and announce search warrant entries.  
Outside, indicates that the killing occurred clearly outside the home, 
including the patrol vehicle, yard, and unattached structures to the main 
structure.119  Street refers to killings unconnected to a warrant 
execution in the home.  This includes encounters originating on the 
street, pursuits leading a substantial distance from the home, or 
apprehended suspects who later escape or attack the police when away 
from the home. 
Secure: In cases of process effecting individuals, this variable 
refers to whether the police have placed the target of the process in 
police custody, primarily indicating the individual has been 
handcuffed.  In the context of search warrants, this variable did not 
apply and was automatically coded as secured. 
Home: This variable identifies whether the contact between the 
assailant and the victim-officer began at the home.  A home is broadly 
defined and includes, single and multifamily dwellings, apartment 
houses and complexes, trailers, stationary or mobile, and motels.  Cases 
where the home is not identified, indicates that the execution of the 
process was initiated at some other location, usually through street 
observation. 
Ambush:  The term ambush was used on a very restricted basis.  
An ambush required that the officer have no knowledge of the killer’s 
whereabouts prior to the killing.  The ambush must be the direct cause 
of the killing; an ambush not resulting in fatal injury of police was not 
included.  LEOKA utilized the term ambush in the summary 
descriptions; unfortunately, it did not appear that the use of the term 
was governed by any form of definition or used consistently.  This 
research did not consider LEOKA’s use of the term “ambush” as an 
indication that an actual ambush took place.  There were significant 
discrepancies between LEOKA’s use of the term and the use for this 
research.  As a general note, the definitions used in this research 
resulted in a greater number of ambushes than those suggested by 
 118. All search warrant cases were coded as having no third party involvement. 
 119. Unattached structures included garages, sheds, etc. 
 
LICHTENBERG FINAL 8/21/2014  4:05 PM 
2014] THE PROTECTIVE SWEEP DOCTRINE 637 
LEOKA. 
Temporal Scope: The data utilized in the study were extracted 
from years 1985 through 1995, totaling ten years of data.120  Though 
more current data is available, this temporal scope was utilized so the 
before and after effects of Buie could be gauged.  This encompassed 
five years of data prior to Buie (1985-1990) and five years after Buie 
(1990-1995).121 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
This Part begins with a brief assessment of the total number of 
police officers feloniously killed during the service or execution of 
process.  Next, it examines whether Buie caused a decrease in the 
number of police officers killed during the execution or service of 
process.122  Each of the five variables discussed earlier is then 
examined individually.123  Part V then discusses the findings and 
conclusions.124 
During the ten-year study period, there were sixty-eight incidents 
in which seventy-six police officers were feloniously killed in the line 
of duty while serving or executing any form of legal process.  This 
results in an annual average of 6.8 incidents and 7.6 police officers 
being feloniously killed in the line of duty while engaged in the service 
of process during the study period.  It is very difficult to gauge the 
dangerousness of this activity since it is unknown how often the police 
engage in the service and execution of process. 
The Buie decision was rendered in the earlier part of 1990.  To 
examine whether Buie affected the rate of felonious killings, officer 
deaths involving service of process in homes were examined both 
before and after Buie.  Five years of data before the Buie decision and 
five years of data after are included for analysis.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the observed changes in the number of police feloniously killed during 




 120. The data was specifically extracted from February 28, 1985 to February 28, 1995.  
These dates were selected to match the date of the Buie decisions release on February 28, 
1990. 
 121. It is impossible to gauge whether Buie had an actual impact on police practices 
governing protective sweeps, it was presumed for purposes of this research that police 
practices and guidelines have followed the law as articulated by the Supreme Court. 
 122. See infra Part IV.A. 
 123. See infra Part IV.B–E. 
 124. See infra Part V. 
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The differences between the before and after data for the felonious 
killing of police officers is slight.  Before Buie, there are thirty-three 
incidents resulting in thirty-six felonious killings; after Buie there are 
thirty-four incidents resulting in forty felonious killings.125  The slight 
increase in fatal incidents after Buie did not achieve statistical 
significance (χ2 = .015, df = 1, p = .9028).126  The slight differences 
observed in the total number of officers killed also did not achieve 
statistical significance (χ2 = .211, df = 1, p = .6464).127  The first 
analysis of the data, attempting to measure if the Buie decision resulted 
in a decrease in the number of felonious killings during process service, 
did not demonstrate any material alteration of the status quo.  In fact, a 
slight and non-significant increase was observed.  Although no 
observable changes were recorded, the finding is limited from a lack of 
knowledge concerning any increases or decreases in process service 
which may have occurred during the period. 
A. Process Service 
This section examines the felonious killings of police officer 
 125. The difference between the number of officers feloniously killed and the number of 
incidents is due to the fact that more than one officer can be feloniously killed in one 
incident. 
 126. The chi squared test statistic used in the analysis is one of the most commonly used 
statistical tests for nominal level data.  The p = .9028 value indicates that there is an over 
90% probability that the observed differences were simply random and not caused by any 
outside forces. 
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during specific process service and execution.  Figure 2 illustrates the 




















Of the seventy-six felonious killings, thirty-six—just over half—
occurred during the execution of an arrest warrant.  This was followed 
by the execution of search warrants, which account for twenty-one 
felonious killings in twenty-one separate incidents.  The service of 
temporary restraining orders, involuntary commitment orders, and civil 
process, account for only twelve—just under sixteen percent—of the 
total felonious killings.  Clearly, service of arrest warrants followed by 
service of search warrants are the more dangerous police practices 
based on the aggregate statistics.  Unfortunately, aggregate statistics 
cannot provide conclusive support that one particular activity is more 
dangerous than another because of the absence of a base rate—amount 
of time an officer spends on the activity—from which to compare.129  
Since the total number of arrest warrant executions is unknown, it is 
impossible to know how dangerous a particular activity is in relation to 
another activity.  This data limitation applies to all other forms of 
process service and also applies to comparisons between them. 
 128. Compare to base rate issue in Garner & Clemmer, supra note 63, with Lichtenberg 
et al, supra note 65, and discussed earlier in this text, supra Part II. 
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B. Home 
The home was one of the more dangerous locations for the service 
and execution of process.  Sixty-five of the seventy-six incidents and 
seventy-four of the eighty-five felonious killings took place at or 
around the suspect’s home, a staggering eighty-seven percent.130  
While this certainly lends support to the Buie Court’s assumption that 
in in-home warrant execution is more dangerous than on-the-street 
encounters, it is again subject to the limitations of the absence of a base 
rate.  It is unknown how many warrants are executed at an individual’s 
home versus on-the-street encounters. 
Although the home, when broadly defined, appears dangerous, the 
Buie Court used a more restrictive analysis of dangerousness than the 
prior analysis.  The prior analysis examined the actual or intended 
service or execution of process in the suspect’s home.  The Buie 
Court’s analysis and the protective sweep doctrine actually apply to 
being physically inside the home.  Figure 3 breaks down the locations 

















When examined in more detail, inside the home remains 
dangerous, but not as dangerous as the first analysis indicated.  The 
majority of the felonious killings of the police occurred prior to entry 
into the home.  Roughly sixty percent of the fatal incidents took place 
outside the home prior to or during entry.  Thus, of the seventy-six 
incidents occurring during this time period, only thirty-one of the 
incidents are within the framework of the protective sweep doctrine. 
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C. Ambush 
Ambushes in the service of process were not uncommon, though 
short of being called a norm.  Of the seventy-six fatal incidents, sixteen 
were classified as ambushes, resulting in the deaths of sixteen of the 
eighty-five police officers killed during the study period.131  The Court 
was very specific about ambushes in the Buie decision.132  The Buie 
Court specifically stated that “[a]n ambush in a confined setting of 
unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more 
familiar surroundings.”133  To further test the Buie Court’s assumption, 
the ambush cases are analyzed separately for the type of process being 
served and the location of the ambush. 
Of the sixteen incidents classified as ambushes, it appears that a 
closer examination provides less support for the Buie Court’s 
assumption.  Only six of the sixteen ambushes occurred inside the 
home, five occurred during a forced entry attempt to execute a search 
warrant, three occurred at the entrance to the home, and two occurred 
outside the home entirely.  Another notable observation is the small 
number of arrest warrant cases involving ambushes.  Arrest warrants 
account for forty-three of the eighty-five police officers slain during the 
service of process—slightly more than fifty-percent.  In the ambush 
context, only four of the sixteen ambush incidents occurred during the 
service of arrest warrants.  It appears that an ambush occurring during 
the execution of arrest warrants is a relatively rare occurrence.  
Notably, search warrants account for eleven of the sixteen ambush 
incidents, many occurred during a forced entry.  It appears that 
ambushes are more frequently related to search warrants, though they 
do occur on occasion in the execution of arrest warrants.  In addition, 
of the fatal ambushes, only six, or 37.5%, occurred inside the home.  
This provides limited support and perhaps even contradicts the Buie 
Court’s assertion that ambushes within the home were to be feared 
more.  It appears that in most ambush situations the police have not 
made entry into the home or are making initial entry. 
D. Secured 
In Buie, the Supreme Court was concerned that even after the 
police secured the principle suspect, the dangers to the police officer 
were not dispelled.134  In this analysis, only one police officer was 
 131. This constitutes 18.8% of the felonious killings, roughly one in five of the fatalities 
the result of an ambush. 
 132. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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fatally assaulted while the suspect was secure.  In this case, it was 
questionable whether the suspect was secure according to the 
definition.  The suspect was not handcuffed, but merely placed in the 
rear of the patrol car, prior to the fatal assault.135  Because this variable 
is interrelated with the third party variable, further discussion will be 
reserved for that section.  It should also be noted that secured did not 
apply to search warrant cases, which were not included in the analysis 
of this variable. 
E. Third Party 
The crux of the Buie decision rested on the presence of unknown 
third parties who might launch an attack against the police after the 
arrest warrant has been executed and the targeted suspect secured.136  
This assumption has some strange aspects surrounding it.  In Buie, the 
police conducted a protective sweep of the basement after they secured 
Buie.137  It seems odd that a third party would launch an attack after the 
removal of the suspect.  Why would an ambush against the police 
occur if the person is already gone?  Because the person undertaking 
the ambush could not free the apprehended suspect if the ambush was 
successful, there appears to be little that could be accomplished, other 
than perhaps seeking revenge. 
The troubled aspect of the Court’s reasoning in Buie directed at 
third parties played out in the reality of the killings during the service 
of process.  No felonious killings of police officers were directly 
attributable to third parties and only in two of the seventy-six incidents 
was there any third party involvement at all.  In one case a third party 
thwarted the initial apprehension of the suspect, by interfering with the 
officer’s arrest, the chase was then resumed, and the officer was later 
slain by the person he was pursuing.  Clearly, the third party did not 
cause the death of the officer; in addition, at the time of the third party 
involvement, the suspect was not in custody.138  In the other case, the 
three officers killed were serving an arrest warrant for a mother and son 
and there were three sons present in the motel room where the slayings 
occurred.  The involvement of the two sons not targeted by the arrest 
warrants is unclear.  Even if the two sons were involved in the slayings 
of the three officers, it does not fulfill the factual requirements of the 
Buie decision as the two suspects targeted by the arrest warrants were 
 135. Id. 
 136. Buie, 494 U.S., at 334. 
 137. Id. at 328. 
 138. Id. 
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clearly not yet secured.139 
This analysis undercuts the crux of the Buie Court’s assumptions 
regarding unknown third parties.  Experience both before and after 
Buie demonstrates that unknown third parties pose little threat to the 
police when service or executing legal process at a suspect’s home. 
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Buie Court entertained a new expansion of the Terry 
rationale, implicating an area significantly protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, the home.140  The Court applied a reasonable suspicion of 
danger to the officer analysis as a justification for the protective sweep 
of the home.141  This was a significant expansion of the Terry 
standard.142 
Until Buie, Terry and progeny were limited to suspicions 
concerning known suspects who could be identified by the police.  
Whether those suspicions were right or wrong was not the point; the 
underlying principle of Terry was that the officer was able to articulate 
specific grounds for the suspicion of a known person.143  Buie 
drastically altered the Terry rationale—rather than requiring the police 
to justify why a particular person may present a threat to the officer or 
others at a particular time, Buie permits police to suspect a person is 
dangerous before the person even is known to exist.  Buie also applied 
to an area where the expectation of privacy was even greater, the 
home.144  Terry involved an on-the-street encounter145 and Long 
involved a motor vehicle stop.146  In both situations, there is a lesser 
expectation of privacy than in the home.  Buie involved a protective 
sweep of an individual’s home, thus allowing reasonable suspicion to 
be applied to the area with the greatest expectation of privacy.  The 
Buie Court qualified this by limiting the protective sweep to places 
where an individual might be hiding, but that limitation leaves little 
outside the scope of the protective sweep.147 
In the traditional balancing test, the interests of the state are 
weighed against those of the individual.148  The stakes are high on both 
 139. Id. 
 140. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990). 
 141. Id. at 335–36. 
 142. Id. at 333. 
 143. Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 144. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335–36. 
 145. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6–7. 
 146. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035–36 (1983). 
 147. Buie, 494 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
 148. Id. at 332. 
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sides of the debate.  On the side of the state are the officer’s interest in 
not being victimized and potentially losing his or her life to an ambush 
or other third party attack.  On the citizen’s side are the interests in not 
having the privacy of the home invaded without a substantial state 
justification. 
This research undertook an empirical examination of the Buie 
Court’s rationale to provide a better understanding of the scope of 
police victimization during in-home warrant and other legal process 
execution and service.  In addition to examining the scope of 
victimization, specific aspects of Buie’s underlying rationale were 
examined empirically.  This empirical study examined how police 
officers are  killed feloniously in the line of duty while executing arrest 
warrants and other process. 
The findings were that the felonious killing of a police officer 
while serving legal process is an infrequent occurrence, an average of 
7.6 officers per year.149  Unfortunately, a danger ratio analysis is not 
possible because the data simply does not provide a base rate from 
which to compare, thus where the dangers of serving legal process falls 
in relation to other police activity remains unknown. 
In support of the Buie Court’s assumption was the finding that the 
home was a particularly dangerous location.150  Eighty-seven percent of 
the officers feloniously killed while serving or executing process 
occurred while attempting to serve or execute process at a home.  This 
supportive finding was limited by the fact that it is unknown how many 
warrants are executed at the home compared to other locations, thus 
making the computation of a danger ratio impossible.  Although 
ninety-one percent occurred in or around the home, the protective 
sweep doctrine also is limited to within the home.  When analyzed in 
this context, the number of police killed inside the home was reduced 
to less than half of the first analysis—approximately thirty-seven 
percent. 
Also supporting the Buie Court’s assumptions were the findings 
concerning felonious killings by type of service.  Arrest warrants 
accounted for nearly fifty percent of the total felonious killings in the 
study.  This finding was again limited by the inability to apply a danger 
ratio, as how often arrest warrants are served in comparison to other 
types of service is unknown. 
The findings on ambushes against the police in the service or 
 149. This is less than the average of 10 police feloniously killed per year during motor 
vehicle stops observed in the Lichtenberg et al, see supra note 65, though this conclusion is 
limited by the inability to apply Garner & Clemmer’s, see supra note 63, danger ratio. 
 150. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 333. 
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execution of process were mixed.  There were ambushes against the 
police—slightly less than twenty percent—but much of this was 
accounted for during search warrant execution, particularly knock and 
announce situations.  Arrest warrant service accounted for only a small 
number of ambushes.  There is limited data to support the Buie Court’s 
contention concerning ambushes, but they are infrequent and usually 
involve search warrants as opposed to arrest warrants. 
In the context of an unknown third party launching an assault 
against the police after the arrest warrant has been executed and the 
suspect restrained, it appears that such attacks, if they occur at all, have 
not been frequent enough or severe enough to result in the felonious 
killing of a police officer.  As discussed earlier, the crux of the Buie 
decision rests on the assumption that unknown third parties are willing 
to launch a potentially lethal attack against the police.151  The attacks 
by potential third parties simply did not occur as the Court believed 
they might.  Third parties were unwilling or unable to launch a fatal 
assault against the police.  The findings of this research conclusively 
point out that the suspects willing to fatally assault the police are the 
targets of the arrest warrant or other process, the people with the most 
to lose.152  This third party concept could not be applied to search 
warrants and perhaps a more focused analysis of the dangers of search 
warrant service would be helpful.  Of course, the applicability of the 
protective sweep doctrine to the execution of search warrants is also 
unclear. 
This research concludes that in a study of fatal assaults against the 
police during a ten-year period, there was no evidence to support a 
conclusion that unknown third parties present a serious threat to the 
police.  It should also be noted that, since Buie, circuit courts have been 
split on the contentious issue of expanding the protective sweep 
doctrine, particularly to situations in which the police gain entry into 
the home through consent and then undertake a protective sweep.153  
Although this research did not specifically attempt to gauge the 
dangerousness of this police practice, the findings should be considered 
instructive for that purpose. 
The findings of this research are limited in certain respects.  The 
absence of the danger ratio is perhaps the most significant limitation 
and especially implicates the findings on the process, location, and 
home variables.  The secure and third party variables are not seriously 
 151. Id. at 334. 
 152. This finding does not necessarily apply to search warrants. 
 153. Jamie Ruf, Note, Expanding Protective Sweeps within the Home, 43 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 143, 155–59 (2006). 
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implicated by the absence of sufficient data to create a danger ratio.  
This research has also relied on data that is now nearly twenty years 
old and more current data is available for analysis.  Finally, the data 
was also extremely limited for its applicability to search warrant 
execution and should be considered with great caution. 
Future research on the dangers of police activities would benefit 
greatly from data allowing the computation of a danger ratio.  Also, 
research independently focusing upon the dangers inherent to the 
execution of search warrants would provide more instructive findings 
concerning the execution of that form of process.  Finally, research 
using the most currently available data may be more useful for policy 
and legal decision-making. 
Even considering the limitations of this research and potential 
benefits of a danger ratio and more current data, the dangers of third 
parties to the police while serving or executing legal process were not 
observed in this study.  The findings of this research strongly suggest 
that the Buie Court’s assumptions relied upon in justifying the 
protective sweep doctrine were erroneous. 
